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Апстракт 
 Трудот има за цел да ја објасни институционалната поставеност на 
оперативниот дел на Заедничката надворешна и безбедносна политика – 
Европската/Заедничка безбедносна и одбранбена политика. Договорот од 
Лисабон воведе некои измени и новини во начинот на кој се спроведува 
надворешната, безбедносната и одбранбената политика на Европската унија, 
правејќи ја последната политика каде меѓувладиниот пристап е 
институционализиран. 
 Трудот ги објаснува потешкотиите со кои се соочуваат институциите и 
државите-членки, имајќи ги во предвид принципот на суверенитет и процесот на 
одлучување во оваа специфична област. Високиот претставник, Европската 
комисија, Европскиот совет, Советот на министри и Европскиот парламент, 
според Договорот од Лисабон учествуваат во развојот на безбедносната и 
одбранбена политика, но државите-членки и натаму се владетели на својата 
надворешна, безбедносна и одбранбена политика. Оттаму, многу зависи од 
волјата на државите-членки за подобрување на перформансите на Европската 
унија како надворешен и безбедносен актер.  
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Abstract 
The paper aims to explain the institutional designation of the operational part of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy – The European/Common Security and 
Defence Policy. The Lisbon Treaty introduced certain changes and innovations in the 
way the foreign, security and defence policy of the European Union is guided, making it 
the last policy where the inter-governmental approach is instutionalized.  
The paper explains the difficulties that institutions and member-states are 
facing, having in mind the sovereignty principle and the decision-making process in 
this specific area. The High Representative, the European Commission, the European 
Council, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, according the Lisbon 
Treaty participate in the Security and Defence Policy development, but member-states 
are still “masters” of their foreign, security and defence policy. By that, much depend 
on the member-states will for improvement of the European Union performances as a 
foreign and security actor. 
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Introduction 
 
The European Security and Defence Policy was created at the European Council 
Summit in Cologne in June 1999, when stared the development of military and civilian 
capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis management. As far as the military 
capabilities, member-states at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, introduced the 
Headline Goal declaring that EU is capable of setting 60.000 troops, deployable for 60 
days and sustainable for one year. At the Nice Summit in December 2000 new 
innovations were created such as the High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military 
Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). In 2004, the Headline Goal was 
further elaborated introducing the battle groups, European Defence Agency and civil-
military cells. 
At the European Council Summit in Santa Maria de Feira in June 2000, EU 
made major steps in developing ESDP modalities in the civilian crisis management. 
First, a Committee responsible for civilian aspects of the crisis management was 
established, and second, the EU member-states agreed in creating an Action Plan for 
introducing four priority areas for civilian crisis management: police, rule of law, civil 
administration and civil protection. Civilian Headline Goal 2008 combines the 
achievements of concrete targets in four above mentioned priority areas with the 
introduction of two new areas: monitoring and support for EU’s Special 
Representatives. Also, Civilian Response Teams were created and the European 
Gendarmerie Force as a special formation that can be designated under civilian or 
military command as an integrated police unit in the ESDP framework. 
 Unanimous decision-making by the European Council and the Council is 
needed, main instigator is the PSC; major military body the EUMC; the EUMP ensures 
competence and support; while the CIVCOM plans and supervise the progress of 
civilian operations. Decisions often implicate use of financial programmes with the 
involvement of the European Commission and each operation has financial coverage 
through ad hoc mechanism included in the common action. Administrative expenses 
are drawn out of the EU budget, while operational expenses from member-states 
according their GDP or other way adopted by the Council. 
 
Common Security and Defence Policy in the Lisbon Treaty  
 
According the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s competences in the CFSP are 
simultaneously increased. The Treaty anticipated the position of the High 
Representative to be coupled with the Commissioner for External Relations, 
introducing the “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy”, at the same time being Vice-President (HR/VP) of the Commission and supported 
by the European External Action Service. Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty made 
innovations for CSDP that are potentially of great significance for development of 
capabilities: creating the function of the HR; establishing the European External Action 
Service; mutual assistance and solidarity clause; introducing the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation. Some elements of the Treaty need to be mentioned: 
 The Treaty stipulates that “the common security and defence policy shall include 
the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a 
common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It 
shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of ... a decision in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”. 
 The Treaty recalls on NATO: “commitments and cooperation in this area shall be 
consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”. 
 The Treaty “institutionalize” the Petersberg tasks: “joint disarmament operations, 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict 
prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.” Also, the Treaty 
underlines the contribution which these missions and operations may have in “the 
fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating 
terrorism in their territories.” 
 In the Treaty is underlined that the provisions covering the CFSP do not give new 
powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the 
EP. This means that the EP shall be regularly consulted and informed by the 
HR/VP on the main aspects and the CFSP and CSDP development.  Still, the fact 
that the HR is also the Vice-President of the Commission ensures the EP with 
additional democratic control regarding the appointments, motion of censure and 
resigns of the Commission and the HR/VP. 
 The Lisbon Treaty provision that the EU shall have legal personality is not going to 
result in changes in the decision-making process. Unanimity shall remain 
necessary for the decisions having “security and defence implications”. As a general 
rule, the Treaty shall “not influence on competences and responsibilities of the 
member-states in the security and defence area, nor over veto competences of each 
member-state on CFSP decisions, thus remaining subject specific rules and 
procedures.” There is a possibility for qualified majority voting when the Council 
adopts decision “defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High 
Representative … has presented following a specific request from the European 
Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative.” 
 
The Function of the HR/VP of the Commission 
 
The EU’s HR for CFSP, at the same time the Vice-President of the European 
Commission, is the successor of the Minister for Foreign Affairs as anticipated by the 
Constitutional Treaty. It may be noticed that the HR/VP will wear two hats, but if we 
consider his/her tasks and responsibilities according the Lisbon Treaty, a third hat 
should be added: the HR/VP shall chair the Foreign Affairs Council. Further, “The High 
Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign 
and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union's 
behalf and shall express the Union's position in international organisations and at 
international conferences.” This means that the HR/VP shall undertake the 
responsibilities of the EU’s Presidency regarding the CFSP issues. 
Also, the HR/VP shall “contribute through his proposals towards the 
preparation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and shall ensure 
implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council” and 
“shall be put into effect by the High Representative and by the Member States”. Finally, 
his/her capacity as the VP of the Commission, shall “ensure the consistency of the 
Union's external action” and “shall be responsible within the Commission for 
responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects 
of the Union's external action. In completing these tasks, the HR/VP shall “ensure 
consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.” He/she “may refer any question 
relating to the common foreign and security policy to the Council and may submit to it, 
respectively, initiatives or proposals.” 
The Lisbon Treaty confirms the actual practice. In theory, the HR now does not 
have the right on initiatives and may only speak on behalf of the EU upon the request of 
the Presidency. In practice, the HR/VP mostly leads the EU on international meetings 
and conferences; meets and talks with foreign officials; make statements reflecting the 
EU’s position; submits to the Council reports containing ideas and recommendations; 
and seats on the negotiating table with third parties. But, the Lisbon Treaty empowers 
the HR/VP with bigger mandate and authority, while regarding his/her foreign 
representation responsibilities, the actual format is not ideal for clearness and 
continuity, as the priority changes with every Presidency rotation.  
On the other side, there shall be checks and balances. The HR/VP shall have 
important role in shaping the decision-making process, but when the policy is 
implemented, shall be bound by the Council’s decisions, except those unanimously 
adopted by the member-states. Also, he/she shall be responsible in front of the 
European Council and the Council, as well as in front of the EP in his/her capacity as 
the VP of the Commission. The difficulties that the HR/VP may have:   
 Without the representation system, the President of the European Council shall 
take part in crisis situations and in representing the EU, which can worry the 
Commission regarding EU’s external representation. Certain mechanisms are 
necessary where EU member-states are kept out of the equation. 
 Another complex issue may be the internal coordination in the Commission, 
especially between the HR/VP and those commissioners still having important 
responsibilities in the external representation area. 
 The connected role between the Commission and the Council may theoretically end 
badly if these institutions find each other in disagreements about certain political 
issues. In such case, the HR/VP shall need to use its knowledge and experience to 
sustain closest possible cohesion among different actors. 
 The HR/VP shall be charged with huge work and responsibilities, needing large 
amount of time and energy. Further, the difficult schedule which the HR/VP needs 
to endure in attempt to listen the EU’s voice abroad, entail the three hats and the 
job description to outstrip even the best abilities of every individual.   
 Another important risk is that the HR/VP may spend a lot of time facing with the 
inner disputes in attempt everyone to be satisfied, regarding the transfer of EU 
messages to third parties and on the international scene. His/her main target shall 
be removing the difficulties or securing the compromise. 
 
Changes in the European External Action Service 
 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) shall be significant asset for 
supporting the HR/VP regarding the external representation. Together, the HR/VP and 
the EEAS may contribute for the decrease of different dichotomies which traditionally 
hampered the Union’s external representation. The Service shall assist the HR/VP in 
formulating the messages by the EU institutions in appropriate manner. Therefore, the 
Service must be organized in a manner for securing the necessary impulse for 
convergence, harmonization, coherence and policy implementation. 
The Lisbon Treaty foresees no clear mandate for the EEAS: “In fulfilling his 
mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action 
Service … and shall comprise officials from … the General Secretariat of the Council and 
of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the 
Member States. The organisation and functioning … shall be established by a decision 
of the Council … shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting 
the EP and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.” 
Most of the organizational and functioning details of the EEAS need to be 
worked out. Generally, there is an agreement for the sui generis nature of the new 
service, although it is a fact that it does not completely connects with some of the EU 
pillars. Therefore, there is a lack of clear image for what this mean in the institutional 
structure frame, as well as for the EEAS degree of autonomy. Ideally, the Council’s and 
Commission’s departments with competences in the external relations should unite in 
the EEAS with all the competent political units of the Council’s General Secretariat and 
the Commission’s General Directorates. This means that all the commissioners with 
external relation responsibilities shall submit reports to the HR/VP. 
Regarding the external representation, the Commission delegations must be 
enforced to become EU’s delegations representing it in international organizations and 
third countries. Appropriate mechanisms needs to be worked out in order to enable the 
delegations to perform its tasks, as well as effective liaison offices and cooperation with 
diplomatic missions of member-states. In international organizations where the EU 
have a status of an observer, working arrangement shall be very important in order to 
secure that the EU messages are of some importance. 
These organizational aspects over the future position of the EEAS concerns the 
different actors involved in the shaping and the creation of the EU’s external acting. 
The Commission is concerned over the possible loss of its general responsibilities, as 
well as the specific competences regarding the external representation. The Council’s 
General Secretariat fears the “centre of gravity” may incline towards the Commission. 
The member-states are concerned about the EEAS impact, particularly by the possible 
degradation of national diplomatic services. The middle and small member-states, 
those not able to be present in all parts of the world are aware of the possibility for the 
enforcement, thorough EEAS, of their external representation and the decrease of 
administration expenses. Also, however, they are concerned that the important 
massages, influencing their crucial national interests, may be adopted by the new 
bureaucratic machinery in which they are misrepresented, especially at the highest 
administrative and decision levels.  
Accordingly, the main challenge is going to be the protection of the original 
nature and role of the EEAS, thus needing to face with tensions which are inherent of 
its sui generis nature; achieving perfect centre between the accepted degree of 
autonomy and the necessary confidence among different institutions; avoiding the 
complications in EEAS as a consequence of conflicts among different actors; and 
minimizing the possible duplication of political responsibilities and support functions. 
Further, member-states shall certainly express their desires to enjoy certain degree of 
supervision and administrative-budgetary control of the EP. 
As a conclusion, there are insecurities regarding the exact shape of EEAS and lot 
will depend from the political will of member-states and the consensus degree. If it is 
adequately equipped and with support of member-states, the EEAS shall effectively rise 
above challenges it faces and play important role in search of greater consistency 
regarding policy formulation and decision implementation. From CSDP point of view, 
while the EEAS might be of some use for the general EU approach, there are strong 
chances for the Service to insist towards more traditional external representation and 
the civilian dimension of the crisis management. 
 
Mutual Assistance Clause and the Solidarity Clause  
 
Regarding mutual assistance, the Treaty provides that “If a Member State is the 
victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards 
it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance 
with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”. Member-states have the obligation to 
secure aid and secure on national basis and shall decide, again on national basis, what 
kind of aid are going to offer. Theoretically, EU as a whole shall not be involved, but 
upon the request of the member-state concerned or the HR/VP, General Affairs Council 
emergency meeting shall be held. The proposal for implementing the clause, which 
needs to be put into effect upon the request of the member-state victim of terroristic 
attack or man-made disasters, is submitted by the HR/VP, while the Council adopts 
decisions with qualified majority and especially in cases with defence implications 
requesting unanimous decisions. Then member-states are coordinating in the Council. 
Further, as a response to the fears that the clause might undermine NATO the Treaty 
stipulates that the solidarity “shall be consistent with commitments under the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains 
the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.” 
Also, several issues refer to the range and nature of the solidarity clause, such as 
the civil protection, police or military units preventively mobilized in activities for crisis 
management. But, do these actions apply “out of area” or on the EU territory and 
whether the solidarity clause is legal provision or political principle? From one side, the 
European Court of Justice jurisdiction implicitly covers the area of the clause, while 
from the other side military assets mobilized on the EU territory may be viewed in the 
frame of political and coordinated Council’s actions. As the implementation of the 
solidarity clause might prove difficult because of the political disagreements, the lack of 
progress might enforce some member-states to move towards accelerated cooperation 
or the ECJ to extend its jurisdiction on implementation of the clause.   
To sum up, the inclusion of mutual assistance and solidarity bears significant 
burden, but most important is that they exist. 
 
Permanent Structured Cooperation 
 
The Lisbon Treaty gives opportunity for member-states to establish Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PSCo) in the defence area, but only for capabilities 
development and operation assets.  
The Lisbon Treaty provisions regarding the modalities for establishing the PSCo 
and the membership criteria are not fully determined, which is not the case with the 
decision procedures. Within three months, the Council, after consulting the HR/VP, 
shall adopt a decision by a qualified majority establishing PSCo and determining the 
list of participating member-states. Any member-state which wishes to participate in 
the PSCo shall notify its intention to the Council and to the HR, after which the 
member-states shall adopt a decision by qualified majority confirming the participation 
based on the fact whether it fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to 
in Protocol 10 on PSCo. If a participating member-state no longer fulfils the criteria or 
is no longer able to meet the commitments regarding Protocol 10, other participating 
members may adopt a decision by qualified majority for suspending the participation of 
the member-state concerned. 
The establishment of the PSCo, the participation of new members and the 
suspension of a member are the three areas where the decisions are adopted by 
qualified majority voting, which means that no single individual member-state has the 
right of veto, while all other decisions regarding the substance of the PSCo shall be 
adopt unanimously by participant states. Still, crucial question remains: when and by 
who shall be the PSCo being established? Protocol 10 refers that the momentum for 
defying the aims and commitments of the PSCo starts on the day when the Treaty 
enters in force. Having in mind the existing lack of clearance regarding the 
commitments and criteria, the possible establishment within three months after 
entering the Treaty into force means that: (1) preparatory work shall be undertaken; (2) 
the details of criteria and commitments previously needs to be clarified; and (3) 
initiative by a small group of capable and/or willing. 
According relevant provisions, the PSCo is established in the Council frame, but 
only participating members may adopt decisions. Also, possibilities are missing on how 
the relevant Council bodies are going to be involved in the PSCo. In its Preamble, the 
Protocol 10 recalls on the importance of the HR being fully involved in proceedings 
relating to PSCo. The Treaty mentions the notification to the HR about the intention of 
member-states to participate, as well as the consultations with the HR before 
establishing the PSCo. This represents that the HR shall be in charge of the PSCo 
meetings in the Council formation. The Council’s Secretariat, EUMP, EEAS and the 
EDA, shall be capable of securing the support for the work and the meetings in the 
PSCo frame. Since the PSCo must face with structural weaknesses of the European 
defence, it is important for the member-states to receive larger part of the actions in 
shaping the relevant decision of special interest. 
The membership criteria are defined in article 1 of protocol 10 as general aims, 
stipulating that PSCo is opened for any member-states which undertake, from the date 
of entry into force of the Treaty, to: 
 proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the 
development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in 
multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the 
activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, 
acquisition and armaments; and 
 have the capacity to supply, either at national level or as a component of 
multinational force groups, combat units, structured at a tactical level as a battle 
group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying 
out the tasks, within a period of 5 to 30 days, in particular in response to requests 
from the UN, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be 
extended up to at least 120 days.  
Article 2 of Protocol 10 indicates the ways for achieving the objectives pointed 
out in article 1. More specifically, the member-states:  
a) cooperate, as from the entry into force of the Treaty, with a view to achieving 
approved objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence 
equipment, and regularly review these objectives, in the light of the security 
environment and of the Union's international responsibilities; 
b) bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, 
particularly by harmonising the identification of their military needs, by pooling 
and, where appropriate, specialising their defence means and capabilities, and by 
encouraging cooperation in the fields of training and logistics. 
c) Take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and 
deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives 
regarding the commitment of forces, including possibly reviewing their national 
decision-making procedures. 
d) Work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good, 
including through multinational approaches, and without prejudice to 
undertakings in this regard within the NATO, the shortfalls perceived in the 
framework of the Capability Development Mechanism. 
e) Take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European 
equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency. 
 
Existing Institutional Problems and Shortfalls 
 
Pulling out the competences of the HR and External Affairs Commissioner and 
uniting them is a solution that avoids the basic conflict among federal and inter-
governmental ideas. The HR shall serve the Commission and the Council and such 
duplication, in practice, is expected to be more challenging for the position holder. 
Another important issue refers on how the HR is going to balance its role with the 
President of the European Council, the Commission and the Council. Regarding the fact 
that with the Treaty a very little is changed in the position of the HR, the restraint is 
illustrated by member-states in challenging their sovereignty in this area. Change in the 
name of the HR is with intention to stress that the EU is not becoming a super-state 
with its own ministers and that the new architecture is not going to replace national 
politics with common EU policy. 
Further, it is not clear how the EEAS is going to be designated in the 
institutional EU frame. In this regard, it is suggested to be given the status of agency or 
common service, subordinate to the Council and the Commission. However, it remains 
unclear the range of representation and the involvement of the Commission and the 
Council. This is evaluated as of crucial importance regarding the bridging of division 
between national and European diplomacy for the inclusion of the member-state’s 
Foreign Affairs ministers as “stakeholders” and enforcement of their relation with the 
High Representative. Still, it needs to be decided how the national diplomatic services 
and the EEAS are going to complement each other. 
Changes regarding flexible arrangements and the CSDP structural cooperation 
have shown especially controversial, leaving many open questions. UK and some 
Central and Eastern Europe member-states still have concerns that this might lead to 
creating blocks in EU, which would be critical for NATO. However, although the 
functional arrangements of the PSCo are specified in special protocol in the Lisbon 
Treaty, more of the provisions are still unclear and remains open which membership 
criteria, with which participants and by which means is the PSCo going to be 
implemented in practice. 
In addition, introducing the mutual assistance clause was disputed among 
member-states. Not only it was not supported by neutral states, undertaking all efforts 
for rephrasing this clause in voluntary commitment, but faced with significant 
contradiction by states closer to NATO. That is why in the Lisbon Treaty the mutual 
defence clause is clearly relieved: it is specified that the mutual defence shall not 
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member-
states and that this commitment shall be implemented in close cooperation with NATO, 
which remains the foundation of collective defence for its member-states.  
Since the Maastricht Treaty there was a struggle among member-states on 
issues regarding which decision-making modalities are able to ensure fast reaction and 
firmness in CSDP. On one side, are the supporters of the unanimous voting because of 
the reasons of national sovereignty, while on the other side, there is a group of 
member-states favouring qualified majority voting. Losing the battle on several 
occasions during the Lisbon Treaty negotiations, there is no possibility to reach 
widespread of qualified majority voting in all CFSP/CSDP areas.  
Although almost 50% of the EU Treaty amendments, contained in the Lisbon 
Treaty, refer to the foreign, security and defence policy, does not mean that 
revolutionary changes are achieved. As the controversies among member-states and 
their national emotions are permanent and intensive, CFSP provisions, and specifically 
CSDP, still have no potential to be an obstacle in the constitutionalization of the 
European integration process. 
 
Instead of Conclusion: What is Next? 
 
The Lisbon Treaty provisions regarding the CSDP and the institutions involved, 
so far failed to answer the fundamental and controversial questions for the course of 
the European defence.  
In the past years since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, EU stood aside and 
watched as the France and UK participated in the North Africa crises, without even 
considering the possibility for intervention according the CSDP frame. If the lesson is 
learnt, member-states must follow more comprehensive and contemporary regional 
strategies. In this context, the PSCo and the Solidarity clause have the best 
implementing potential. In the meantime, the more controversial provisions for mutual 
assistance and the possibility to entrust the execution of a task to a group of member-
states as a last resort, should remain on the agenda.  
It was not meant to be like this. On the contrary, the Lisbon Treaty should give 
the CSDP better institutional arrangements for defining the EU’s foreign policy 
strategic interests. In practice, the Treaty stopped the CSDP in its course. Even in 2012 
there was a possibility for renewal process for the CSDP after the initial 20 crisis 
management operation from 2003 till 2009. The EEAS concluded that the EU’s role as 
a security actor is rapidly expanding, only to confirm that the missions - all civilians - 
are comprised of around 60 member personnel. In the meantime, the CSDP mission in 
Libya is facing difficulties; while in Mali the EU did not response and left the risky 
operation to France.  
The abovementioned institutional issues are not completely solved with the 
Lisbon Treaty as the rivalry among institutions continue despite introducing the new 
novelties. Having in mind that it is impossible by the Treaty text to pull out the 
distribution of responsibilities between institutions, Treaty provisions aim to draw out 
bigger influence for the newly created structures. Also, member-states get in this 
picture. Since the beginning it was clear that the political competition instead of actual 
will for enhancing the effectiveness shall change their conduct towards the 
implementation of the Treaty provisions and national governments are shaping them 
according their own fashion.  
The Treaty increased the HR’s responsibilities in the expense of the Commission 
and the Presidency, but is does not gives bigger authority for the EP, except that the 
new position of the HR shall be approved by the EP. Also, the Treaty does not exclude 
the unanimous voting regarding the CSDP, whether about missions, initiatives or 
contractual arrangement with security or defence implications. While the Lisbon Treaty 
formally removed the pillar structure, CSDP is still far from other EU politics. 
To sum up, the EU performances in security and crisis management according 
the Lisbon Treaty might be categorized as slow, minimal and timid. EU must prove that 
CSDP provisions in the Lisbon Treaty are not just symbolic, but consistent and with 
desired aim. European and national policy-makers must seat on the same table and 
arrange the details for further implementation of the Lisbon Treaty provisions. On the 
other side, if the Lisbon Treaty provisions are used in practice, for example, the mutual 
assistance and the solidarity clause, the EU’s profile shall start to gain its significance 
and cooperation among member-states. But, for this to happen and for EU to become a 
true security and defence actor, there is a need of more ambitious arrangement among 
member-states and the new CSDP provisions of the Treaty might just show the way.  
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